- The measures Inspector Clueless might take to keep things under control at the parade
The Human Rights Act enacted in 1998 mandates public authorities such as the police and other law enforcement authorities to engage in actions that align with the prerequisites detailed by the European Convention on Human Rights. Additionally, the Public Order Act implemented in 1986, underscores their statutory powers as well as duties with respect to policing parades or processions. Furthermore, their undertakings must uphold the requirements of the Criminal Law Act that came into effect in 1967 in addition to the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act adopted in 1994. Moreover, their conduct must also conform to the prerequisites of the Criminal Evidence Act affected in 1984 (Farrugia and Gabbert 2019). The regulations confer the mandate to law enforcers to prevent circumstances that culminate in a breach of peace.
The incident described underscores a scenario in which Alice obtains some information with respect to Pat’s appearance on the Question Hour culminating in her decision to change the parade’s route. However, she does not inform the relevant authorities of the changes intended. The Public Order Act of 1986 mandates the individuals responsible for organizing public processions to issue a notice indicating the routes selected for the march and the location did appropriate for the event (Grace 2018). In light of maintaining peace at the gathering, Inspector Clueless must refrain from dispersing the crowd as the procession remains lawful despite the fact that the organizers have become liable for a breach with respect to the Act’s terms.
The participants in the procession have the right to exercise the privilege, as indicated by the ECHR. More specifically, Article 9 acknowledges an individual’s freedom of religion, as well as conscience. Moreover, Article 10 allows individuals to exercise their freedom of expression that provides an allowance for holding opinions. In addition, it provides the legal mandate under which individuals can receive or impart information. In Wingrove v. United Kingdom (1997), Wingrove directed the film ‘Visions of Ecstasy’ depicting Jesus erotically with St Theresa d’Avila. The film became subject to rejection by the British Boad of Film Classification as per the provisions of Obscene Publications Acts implemented in 1959 as well as 1964. However, the court evaluated the facts presented with regard to the prerequisites set out in article 10. Eventually, the decision provided by the court cleared Wingrove from any allegations that indicated the prevalence of an offense.
Despite the allowances provided by the Convention, it becomes apparent that Alice aims at ensuring that the procession also converges at Television Centre. Furthermore, she indicates an intention to abuse Pat and other people supporting her and the Unite Against Europe Party as soon as they arrive at the scene. Nonetheless, the Public Order Act provides an explicit explanation of circumstances in which an offense becomes apparent intentionally harassing, alarming, or distressing another person. More specifically, section 4(A) indicates that an offense occurs in circumstances where a person uses threats, words and behavioral tendencies that may prove disorderly meant to insult or abuse the other party. Furthermore, the misdemeanor may occur publicly or privately. Under such circumstances, Inspector Clueless can rely on the provisions indicated in section 12 coupled with section 14 of the Act. Additionally, various constituent elements mandate evaluation to determine the prevalence of an offense in section 5. They include the actions of the offending party, their intentions, and anticipated impact. For instance, the appellant covered his window with a poster stating ‘Islam out of Britain’ in Norwood v. DPP (2003). The terms indicated in 5(1)(b) underscored the offensive nature of the racial insult using several matters to establish the proof presented efficiently. The provisions enshrined in the legislation provide an avenue through which the police can apply various conditions with respect to public parades restricting some freedoms and even actions of the participants. Even so, the law enforcement officer must indicate the propensity of the procession to seriously damage property and public order. Furthermore, they must also ascertain that it may disrupt community life or is that the primary objective of event organizers pertains to intimidating others.
Inspector Clueless can implement psychological techniques to ensure that the crowd remains under control. They include relying on persuasive appeals that predominantly depend on the conduct of procession participants. More specifically, he must endeavor to emphasize on the crowd’s ability to rely on his support provided that their actions conform to the law’s requirements. Additionally, the Inspector can seek some assistance from individuals with acknowledged influence, especially in situations that involve tension in the crowd. Thus, it becomes essential to capitalize on the good relations cultivated with locally influential people. The success associated with controlling processions or parades emanates from the ability of law enforcers, such as the inspector to maintain his emotional stability in addition to a silent attitude. It provides an avenue through which the inspector can exert his influence powerfully.
As a last resort, Inspector Clueless may rely on police action for crowd control purposes. Under such circumstances, he may capitalize on the Criminal Law Act’s provisions implemented in 1967 in addition to the Criminal Evidence Act of 1984. However, he must only apply force reasonably (Trinkner, Kerrison and Goff 2019). In such a scenario, the term ‘reasonable’ relates to a necessity underlined by law-related purposes. Moreover, the force applied must indicate some proportionality and also qualify as reasonable. Thus, Inspector Clueless can only use a minimum amount of force for the attainment of law-related objectives. On the other hand, the law also asserts the unlawful nature of excessive force. Under such circumstances, individuals responsible for dispensing the police’s mandates, such as the inspector must respect human life. Furthermore, the inspector must endeavor to minimize damages and injuries while ensuring to provide proportionate responses that indicate his capacity to exercise restraint. Even so, police action must focus on the parties whose actions result in a breach-of-the-peace. Reasonable conduct should provide a basis upon which an individual becomes exempted from police heavy handedness as in R (Laporte) v Chief Constable of Gloucestershire Constabulary [2006].
The law makes a provision that allows Inspector Clueless to implement containment to aid in crowd control (Neal, Opitz and Zebrowski 2019). The approach provides an avenue of upholding the liberty accruing to individual parade participants, especially where the law enforcer applies the technique in good faith. It must also harbor the appropriate proportions in lieu of the situation at hand. Additionally, its enforcement must only occur for as long as reasonably necessary. Under such circumstances, the Inspector’s conduct will indicate some alignment with Article 5 provisions of the ECHR. In Austin v United Kingdom [2012], good intentions became irrelevant to the inquisition at hand and the legal procedures focused on establishing whether the inability of the individuals involved to enjoy their legally conferred liberty occurred objectively. Additionally, the measures implemented for restrictive purposes were reviewed coupled with the subjective intentions. The decision provided by the ECtHR underlined the importance of assessing the type of strategies applied for restrictive purposes and the process used for the implementation. The House of Lords’ ruling also eliminated the prevalence of a circumstance characterized by some restriction to exercise an individual’s liberty. Moreover, it acknowledged the importance of ascertaining that the police could discretely make their respective operational decisions.
- An evaluation to determine whether Inspector Clueless has performed illegal arrests and stop and searches on the 2 redshirted men
The power conferred on police officers provides a leeway through which they can stop and search a person or their vehicles (Bowling and Marks 2017). In the United Kingdom, various legislations highlight the prerequisites applicable in such circumstances including the Police and Criminal Evidence Act implemented in 1984, section 1. Additionally, the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act enacted in 1994 efficiently highlights provisions applicable to stop and search-related procedures in section 60, whereas the Terrorism Act adopted in 2000 also stipulates some applicable prerequisites relating to such police powers. PACE Code A provides the directives relating to exercising the powers and also outlines the principles necessary in guiding stop and search initiatives.
After stopping an individual, a law enforcement officer must ensure that they immediately apply the legal provisions applicable in such circumstances. Displaying a warrant card serves as a prelude to the search process of a targeted individual by an officer (Lennon and Murray 2018). Additionally, the authority enforcing the law must ensure that the person understands that their detention provides an avenue of subjecting them to search-related procedures. An evaluation of Inspector Clueless’ conduct reveals that he skips the guideline. Instead, he demands to see the content of the targeted individuals’ bags immediately after leaving his car. Furthermore, PACE Code A requires an officer to tell the detained parties their name and only overlook the requirements in situations where the ongoing investigations focus on acts of terrorism. Under such circumstances, the authority enforcing the law can reasonably conclude that informing the detainee of their name could culminate in some dangerous outcomes (Topping and Schubotz 2018). Even so, the officer remains obligated to ensure that the target reviews their identification number or even warrant. Inspector Clueless stops the men and fails to observe the protocols. Furthermore, he does not even inform the men of the name used in reference to the police station with which he is affiliated. He also refrains from informing the men of the legal power that facilitates the implementation of the search. Additionally, he keeps the men ignorant with regard to the search’s object as per the terms stipulated in the articles that bestow the power upon a police officer to conduct a search.
More specifically, Inspector Clueless should have elaborated on legislations such as the Investigation Measures Act implemented in 2011 and the nature accruing to the power exercised. The responsibilities of a law enforcement officer also require an elaborate explanation relating to other powers that mandate some reasonable suspicion in addition to their respective grounds (Tiratelli, Quinton and Bradford 2018). Additionally, the justification provided must refer to some actual behavioral tendencies relating to the detained person. However, Inspector Clueless seems oblivious to such requirements.
In such scenarios, the individual subjected to search procedures must also understand their entitlement to receive recorded copy pertaining to the process provided they make a request not later than 3 months after the incident (Nawaz and Tankebe 2018). In some cases, police officers may also issue receipts explaining the processes involved in acquiring a copy that fully records all the events pertaining to the search. Inspector clueless fails to ensure that the detained parties understand such provisions as per the regulations applicable in the UK (Bradford and Loader 2016). Consequently, the officer fails to provide information relating to the detainee’s ethnicity in lieu of the officers perception. The records also indicate the location, date as well as time when the search was executed (Murray and Harkin 2017). Additionally, it also asserts the applicable objects in reference to the terms underscore in the relevant articles. The records issued must either be in an electronic or hard copy form (Bradford and Jackson 2016). The officer also takes the men to the station after arresting them. The detainees remain at the facility for 12 hours before receiving some information relating to their detention. However, stop and search protocols make it mandatory for law enforcers to detain the targeted individuals for a minimum amount of time. Even so, the men taken into custody by Inspector Clueless wait for 50% of their day while at the police station before obtaining any meaningful information. Additionally, it becomes apparent that the officer even fails to prepare a custody record for the men which mandate preparation within the shortest amount of time at the police facility.
A review of the factors prevalent in inspector Clueless’ case makes it possible to conclude that he performed the arrests illegally. His inability to adequately apply the protocols associated with stop-and-search procedures also makes the process illegal.
Question 2
The Human Rights Act was implemented by the United Kingdom as a parliamentary act. In 1988, it acquired a royal assent and became operational in the year 2000. The regulation endeavored to facilitate an integration of the European Convention on Human Rights provisions in the laws implemented by the UK. As a result of the Act, courts operating in the nation can access remedies in lieu of breached Convention rights, curtailing the necessity to engage the European Court of Human Rights. The Act provides restrictions with respect to undertakings affiliated with public bodies that become deemed as incompatible with regard to the Convention’s provisions, particularly in circumstances where primary legislation refrain from availing other choices (Hardman, 2019). Furthermore, it makes it a prerequisite for the judiciary to consider the European Court of Human Rights’ judgments or opinions. Additionally, legislation interpretation must occur in a manner that upholds the rights detailed in the Convention. Moreover, it makes an allowance for the issuance of a declaration stating some incompatibility in circumstances that make it impossible to interpret Parliamentary Acts to guarantee their unanimity. More specifically, it restricts judges from overriding an Act of Parliament, ensuring that it remains valid despite the declaration. In such circumstances, it becomes possible to understand that the Human Rights Act endeavors to uphold the parliamentary sovereignty principle in accordance with the UK’s constitution. However, the Convention provides liberties with respect to secondary legislation allowing judges to strike them down. The Strasbourg court becomes acknowledged in the Act as a means through which individuals can instigate lawsuits. The U.K’s constitution acknowledges the right of Parliament to come up with laws or even admit legislation and restricts the capacity of people and bodies operating in England to override or side-step parliamentary legislation. Under such circumstances, it becomes essential to conduct an evaluation as to whether parliamentary sovereignty becomes undermined by the Human Rights Act’s sections 3 and 4.
Section 3 (1) of the Act indicates the duties that a court must seek to fulfill indicating that “so far as it is possible to do so” they must read and effect primary as well as subordinate legislation ensuring their compatibility with Convention-related rights (Liberty 2010, p. 9). 3 (2) elaborates that “this article does not affect the validity, continuing operation or enforcement of any incompatible” legislation of a primary or even subordinate nature (Bellamy 2011, p. 98). Section 3 underscores new principles applicable in the circumstances requiring some statutory construction and particularly where they align with the Convention’s prerequisites relating to human rights. Under such circumstances, courts become obligated to perform legislative functions that involve recasting legislation. Consequently, judges exert some significant authority with respect to the meaning behind the words used legislatively. Thus, the resulting effect extensively diverts from what the Parliament initially envisaged or intended culminating in the Act’s implementation (Hardman 2019). As such, legislation becomes subject to adjudication merges that presents some unprecedented odds in lieu of the doctrine of Separation of powers. Moreover, a keen review of section 3 highlights its sophisticated protocols applicable in situations where Parliament subjects individual-related rights to some form of compromise, especially where the circumstances involve minority groups. In Young, James & Webster v. United Kingdom (1981), minorities deserve proper treatment characterized by fairness, avoiding instances that paved the way for the achievement of some balance. The legitimate approach provides a scenario in which Parliament must contend with a weakening ability to claim notions traditionally associated with its sovereignty.
In Mendoza v. Ghaidan (2002), it becomes possible to understand how to apply the statutory principles affiliated with section 3. More specifically, the House of Lords relied on its prerequisites as a means of overturning its Rent Act 1977’s interpretation despite the fact that the HRA had not become applicable in Fitzpatrick v. Sterling Housing Association Ltd (2001). It provides an avenue for courts to rewrite legislation when necessary through the addition of words particularly where the regulations involved indicate a refusal two effects the Act’s plain language under the condition that they endeavor to facilitate the preservation of human rights. Its application indicates some similarity with the Marleasing doctrine utilized with regards to the laws implemented in the EU. More specifically, the decision in Ghaidan situates section 3 in that circumstances involve purposive interpretation at varying degrees and interpretative methods that demand priority. The factual matrix integral to Fitzpatrick attracts some review with respect to Ghaidan contrasting the first case’s purposive approach and Lord Nicholls’ bold approach in the second. ‘Abstract purposive interpretation’ becomes apparent as the perspective adopted by Lord Nicholls mandating an evaluation of the legitimacy that accrues to judges constitutionally in ensuring the determination and enforcement of a statute’s abstract purpose (van Zyl Smit 2007, p. 294). Additionally, it provides an avenue of conducting an inquiry into the legal certainty anticipated under such circumstances. Even so, Ghaidan addresses the concerns by dicta, indicating that a statute’s fundamental features mandate some respect from the court while avoiding making decisions on various aspects that require legislative deliberation.
Furthermore, an assessment of the facts pertaining to the legal proceedings in Mendoza v. Ghaidan (2002) made it mandatory for the court to make some declarations as per the HRA. Such declarations confine parliamentary sovereignty. The options included indicating a need to expansively read legislation, ensuring that it could cater to homosexual partners as a means of preventing discrimination. On the other hand, it could declare the legislation’s incompatibility as per the prerequisites of human rights. The court’s majority indicated a strong preference for the first declaration. Albeit the decision, Parliament had to explore the possibilities presented by the case that could involve revising the law to ensure that it incorporated closed-ended language (Wilson, 2017). Moreover, it could ignore the court’s declaration, particularly where it underscored the legislation’s incompatible nature with respect to the HRA (Wagner and Barth 2016). However, exploring the options presented had a potential of ruining Parliament’s reputation in light of its ability to ensure that standards pertaining to human rights were upheld. Even so, the court’s reduced capacity to hinder Parliament’s capacity to make laws becomes apparent in the case. Additionally, it also highlights the inability of the court to impose on Parliament sovereign powers. The available ministerial statements indicate numerous inconsistencies pertaining to the powers affiliated with the judiciary in accordance to Parliament defined boundaries. Even so, section 3(1) has attracted Parliament’s efforts in deciphering its meaning in Pepper v. Hart (1993). More specifically, it provides a boundary that mandates the court adherence in circumstances that demand the protection of convention rights, particularly where an implied repeal becomes a requirement. In the case, the utilization of implied repeals attracts some prohibitions despite the fact that courts can resort to principles relating to interpretation as a means of guaranteeing similar effects.
In most cases, the doctrine of implied repeal always culminate in the assumption by courts certain situations where explicit repeals prove absent with respect to a given legislation or even a challenge culminates in the supposition that parliament intended its compatibility with various regulations already in existence. Thus, new laws become subject to the interpretation “so far as it is possible” whereas courts have explicit reasons of adopting the perspective with respect to the HRA’s section 19 provisions relating to declarations of compatibility (Liberty 2010, p. 9). In cases that involve incompatible legislation, it becomes necessary to highlight the incompatibility explicitly. Under such circumstances, an argument arises with respect to replacing implied repeals in favor of explicitly repeals. However, Convention rights fail to align with such provisions mandating repeals that occur implicitly and explicitly because of the Act’s limitations to cases out of the confines of section 4, thereby deemed as incompatible in relation to its provisions.
Even so, the Act explicitly prevents judges rescinding a given legislation requiring a declaration in conformance to section 4 of the Act. Judicial declarations relating to incompatibility result in the traditional provisions that relate to parliamentary sovereignty. The mechanism applicable in lieu of the declaration of incompatibility focuses on embedding parliamentary sovereignty while rendering incompatible legislation valid, operational, and even enforceable (Wilson, 2017). Additionally, parliament must decide whether to issue a response in addition to the government as a result of public opinion where the masses demand some modifications for a given law. As such, elementary suzerain it becomes evident as the Parliament draws its law making power as the public’s representative. Even so, the declarations lack practical effects. However, the regulation accords the responsibility of coming up with a declaration of incompatibility to the highest courts. Under such circumstances, it becomes possible to instigate the appropriate legislative processes necessary for remedial actions despite the fact that court-related decisions can hardly affect how Parliament handles the issues involved.
In A v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (2005), it becomes possible to evaluate an instance in which parliament handles a court’s ruling. The case involves conflicting opinions relating to human rights and their implications on national security. In 2001, the United Kingdom implemented the Anti-terrorism, Crime, and Security Act (Ng, 2019) after America’s 9/11 incident. Section 23 of Part 4 highlighted the propensity of detaining an individual as an international terrorists, particularly where they become subject to suspicions albeit their prevention from leaving the United Kingdom or facing removal from the nation. More specifically, laws pertaining to international agreement could facilitate the provisions enactment, and some situations would require practical consideration. As a result of the regulation, the United Kingdom’s government had the mandate of detaining non-British nationals upon suspicion of their engagement in terrorism activities and eventually ensures their deportation. The provision affected Belmarsh Prison in lieu of some of the individuals it held. More specifically, the individuals belonged to nations that practiced torture. As such, a breach would occur with respect to the European Convention on Human Rights’ provisions as deportation heightened the risk that they would suffer some unfortunate circumstances. A review of the facts therein by the House of Lords Appellate Committee highlighted the unlawful nature of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act. Power restrictions made it difficult for the House of Lords to declare the act void or to indicate their refusal in ensuring its application culminating in the issuance of a declaration of incompatibility. In the circumstances presented, parliament acknowledged that non-UK citizens had become subject to unreasonable discrimination. It embarked on issuing an appropriate response after several months facilitating the adoption of a scheme that could implement new control-order. The release of prisoners occurred after the enactment of another legislation which subjected the parties involved to immediate rearrest. Thus, it becomes difficult to assert that Parliament concedes to judicial supremacy. Moreover, Parliament has the option of amending or repealing an offending Act without any underlying legal obligations in such situations. Section 4 of the Human Rights Act provides an avenue through which courts can reinforce Parliament responsibilities (Colegate 2020).
The HRA’s implementation has culminated in 28 declarations out of which 18 have become final catapulting some re-legislation by Parliament. More specifically, democratic dialogue has become applicable as a means of ascertaining the preservation of parliamentary sovereignty (Dimelow 2017). As such, the role attributable to Parliament becomes regarded respectfully owing to its responsibility in developing the UK’s laws. The Human Rights Bill implemented in 1977 provides an affirmation with respect to the perspective. The HRA underlines various safeguards aimed at preventing interference evident with respect to fundamental rights particularly where such instances manifest in an arbitrary manner. At the same time, the Act endeavors to ascertain that Parliament maintains its autonomy with regard to making response-related decisions focusing on declarations of incompatibility providing an avenue through which it can exert its sovereignty. Under such circumstances, it provides an avenue that ensures that the UK operates in accordance to its democratic values. Even so, section 3 indicates a capacity of affecting parliamentary sovereignty as a result of court-related decisions that enforce its provisions whereas section 4 fails to indicate a similar level of influence.
References
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