The origins of the six day war-MAH_140115_25420_2_49697

The origin of the Six Day War that took place in June 1967 can be traced to nearly two decades back when the first Arab-Israeli war concluded in 1958 with the establishment of the state of Israel and with armistice agreements that were concluded on the Egyptian, Jordanian and Syrian fronts. These armistice agreements were supervised by the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization or the UNTSO.  However in 1956, the enmity of Israel with Egypt increased significantly when it invaded Sinai along with the support from Britain and France as a reaction to the nationalization of the Suez Canal as announced by President Nasser. The war on the issue of Suez Canal ended with the signing of two principal agreements. These were related with the establishment of the United Nations Emergency Force that was deployed along the Egyptian Israeli border but the force was only stationed on the Egyptian territory. The second agreement was the Egyptian approval of free passage of designer ships in the Gulf of Aqba that were heading towards the Israeli port of Eilat moving through the Straits of Tiran.[1]

As a result of the aftermath of Syrian-Israeli clashes that took place in April 1967, there was a crisis when it was reported to Egypt by Syria and the Soviet Union regarding the Israeli mobilization which indicated an attack on Syria. In this regard, President Nasser assured to standby Syria’s aid and he also decided to take a number of escalator steps which included the mobilization of Egyptian troops in Sinai on May 14 and also a request for withdrawing the United Nations Emergency Force on May 16. Another such steps included the declaration of the Straits of Tiran as being closed for Israeli Ships on May 22. As a result of the ostensible threat of Egypt, a general war was waged by Israel on June 5 and the armies of Egypt, Jordan and Syria were overcome and at the same time, the army of Israel also occupied the land Heights, the Sinai, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Even after the passage of four decades and with the exception of Egyptian Sinai, the Middle East is still dealing with the repercussions created by this war as well as this occupation.[2]

There are two major explanationsof the models that are used for understanding the origin of Six-Day War. These models are that of ‘conspiracy’ and the model of ‘inadvertent war’. A conspiracy has been defined by the Oxford English dictionary as, “an agreement between two or more persons to do something criminal, illegal, or reprehensible”. In this way, the history shows that conspiracies are present, although it is very difficult to document these conspiracies. However there is a rare exception present in this regard in the form of the Treaty of Sevres that was signed on 24 October, 1956 in Paris between Britain, France and Israel in order to attract Egypt and in this Treaty, the intrigue of the conspirators was recorded in writing. In this regard, Martin Parker has stated that, “conspiracy is predicated on uncovering a specific form of order and structure. Once we inhabit the animated universe of conspiracy, there can be no unexplained residues, everything has a cause, everything has meaning and nothing can be left out.” Apart from the concept of ‘conspiracy’there is the conspiratorial thinking that has been considered by Mark Featherstone as a “pathological effect of diluting of social recognition, a paranoid form of non-knowledge”.

According to the conspiracy theory model, it has been stated by the experts that the Six-Day War that took place in June 1967 took place after the premeditated conspiracy between Israel and the United States with a view to topple the regime of President Nasser. In this regard, the earliest claims related with the Western conspiracy can be attributed to President Nasser himself.[3] As he was shocked by the collapse of his forces, in a conversation over the phone with King Hussein of Jordan on June 6, he asked if we can say that the United States and Britain are attacking them or will it just be the United States. In reply to this query, King Hussein replied that it will be the United States and England. In order to justify their case, the advocates of the conspiracy theory point out the special relationship that exists between Israel and the United States as well as the advice given by the US President Johnson to Nasser to exercise restraint. In this regard, they also point out towards the communications between the United States and Israel before the Israeli strike. At the same time, it also needs to be noted that there is another theory parallel to the US-Israel conspiracy theory according to which the Six-Day War was a result of premeditated strategies of Egypt and the Soviet Union.[4]

On the other hand, according to the proponents of the other model, the Six-Day War is the textbook case of an “inadvertent war”. This means a war that has been caused by miscalculation and/or misperception due to the reason that the belligerents did not want to make the war when the crisis was started. As against the conspiracy theory, the case of the inadvertent war explanation is more prevalent outside the Arab world. After an analysis of the crisis, it has been stated by Charles Yost, who is in a Middle East expert and worked in the US Embassy in Cairo in 1967 that it was not the intention or design of any government to start a war in the Middle East in 1967.[5] In the same way, another study conducted by Janice Stein has proposed two scenarios for what has been ordered by her as the ‘miscalculated escalation’.[6] According to her either President Nasser misperceived the Egyptian capabilities and provoked a war that Israel wanted to avert or the defensive posture of the mobilized Israeli Defense forces was miscalculated by Egypt as an offensive.[7]

The origin of the war: although we are approaching the 40th anniversary of this war, it is still important to recall the causes behind the war and the factors that have led us to the present situation. However these are very expensive and complicated but still it needs to be understood that essentially the Six-Day War was a local expression of a wider conflict. The Western powers have retained a political, economic and historical interest in the Middle East. This brought the intentions of the Soviet Union to penetrate the region and it also limited the sphere of influence of the Soviet Union in the region that was also trying to destabilize the adult relationships with the Western world. In case of the Egypt, America had already been supplanted by Russia when they financed the construction of Aswan Dam and also by the supply of arms to Syria and other Islamic countries in the Middle East. On the other hand, among the local reasons, the scarcity of water in Israel resulted in an escalating tension which was capitalized by the Soviet Union through their misinformation tactics. The result was a war that Israel unsuccessfully tried to avert and the results of this war are reverberating till this date.

The proximate causes of the war: there are seven proximate causes that embedded his right to take military action on June 6, 1967. While five of these causes constituted direct causi belli, there were two other causes that were of a different nature. While one cause was political in nature, the other cause was related with the scarcity of water in Israel.

Egyptian blockade against Israeli ships in international waters: the Straits of Tiran and the failure of the maritime nations to honor their undertakings that were given to Israel after the Suez campaign to challenge such a blockade if it was imposed by Egypt.

The existence of the United Nations in removing peacekeeping forces from Egyptian-Israel border:

As the threat of Soviet intervention was hanging on their hits in 1956, in case Israel failed to withdraw from the Suez Canal, intensive diplomatic negotiations were conducted by Israel, Britain and France with the United States as well as with the United Nations. As a result of these diplomatic negotiations, two “good-faith” agreements were created between the parties according to which some level of security was given to Israel in lieu of withdrawing from the Suez Canal zone.

The first agreement was concluded between President Nasser and the Secretary General and according to this agreement, a promise was made to Egypt that it would have the right to demand the removal of UN forces from its territory after their mission had been completed by the peacekeepers but only after the matter has been considered by the Gen. assembly of the United Nations. In the same way, the second agreement was concluded between the Secretary of State of the United States and the foreign minister of Israel according to which, it was undertaken by the United States that it would consider any attempt by Egypt to interfere with the right of free passage enjoyed by Israel through the Straits ofTiran or any fidayeen attacks that emanated from the Gaza as causi belli.

At the same time, it was also agreed that in case such events occurred which allowed Israel to act in self-defense according to article 51 of the UN charter and Israel and the text to inform the United States of any such intention. In case the United Nations were going to abandon any of its responsibilities in Egypt, it was agreed that the United States, Britain and France were going to support Israel if it found itself in the position where it was required to take action in self-defense in the wake of Egyptian aggression. The efficacy of this agreement was visible in the fact that between March 1957 and May 1967 there was not even a single case of armed attack against Israel from the Gaza Strip.

Another such cause was the massing of troops on the Egyptian, Lebanese and the Syrian border that are poised for an invasion.

The Jordanian attack on the part of Jerusalem that was held by Israel since 1948, as well as on the UN enclave around the government house despite the approach by Israel that in case Jordan remained uninvolved, it would not be attacked by Israel was also a cause of the war.

Another significant reason behind the war was water. In this regard, General Odd Bull, who was once the commander of UN observer forces in that area committed that the roots of 1967 war started much earlier in 1964.[8] On May 28, Israel started to pump water from River Jordan for the purpose of irrigating the Negev which is the desert southern part of the country. The quantity of water that was taken by Israel was within the quantity allocated to Israel according to the Eric Johnson plan of 1955 for sharing the water of Jordan River and its tributaries between Israel and the neighboring countries.[9] However at a meeting in 1964, the Arab governments objected to this development of the Negev region by Israel in this way and decided to counter the action of Israel by drawing water from two out of the three tributaries of Jordan River and the averting the water eastwards and then southwards into the River Yarmik within the territory of Jordan. To this, Israel reacted and it notified the Armistice Commission as well as the UN Security Council that the implementation of these plans will be considered as an aggression by Israel and also a breach of the Armistice agreements. As a result when the government of Syria actually tried to divert the Banyas within its borders, Israel responded by three attacks by the Army and Air Force on the site of diversion.

At this point, it also needs to be noted that the observations of General Odd Bull that the origin of the war was in 1964 can be considered as misleading. In fact the War of 1967 has started much earlier when the British agreed that they will transfer the control of the headwaters of Jordan to France under the Franco-British Boundary Convention that was signed between them in 1920.

Terrorist activities emanating from Jordan: the infiltration of terrorists from Jordan as well as the attacks on civilian settlements in Israel contributed in increasing the insecurity of Israel. On first of April, 1967, a water pump was blown up by Palestinian infiltrators at Kibbutz, falling on the Lebanese border. After some time, on seven April, 1967, Syrians opened fire on two Israeli tractors that were entering the demilitarized zone situated between Syria and Israel.It started a battle on land with escalated into a battle in the air when the planes of Israel attacked Syrian installations and also engaged with the Air Force of Syria. Huge dog fight took place over Damascus in which nearly 130 aircraft were involved and 4 Syrian MiGs were shot down and the Mirage aircraft’s of Israel did a victory loop over Damascus.[10]

Soviet disinformation: it is also considered as a significant reason behind the origin of 1967 war. Many believe that the Soviet disinformation tactics were also responsible for instigating the war. As a result of the Israeli Air Force attacks on Syria, the Soviets were placed in a position where they can feed Syria and ultimately Egypt with this information related with the supposed intentions of Israel which provoked Egypt to take military action against Israel.[11] On 8 May, 1966, the first mention of the suspicious movement of Israeli troops sighted along with the border of Syria was made in a TASS cable from Damascus. By May 21, there was information that nearly 1/3 of the Israeli Army had been shifted to the border along with Syria.[12] At least eight warning notices was sent by the Foreign Ministry of Russia to the diplomats of Israel in which it was alleged that there was an Israeli troop buildup on the border along with Syria,which was not true. The Israeli Premier, Eshkol even suggested that the Soviet Ambassador can himself go to the northern border and check the presence of troops. However the Soviet ambassador replied that his job was only to communicate the Soviet truths and not test the authenticity of these statements.[13]

U.N. Inaction: the inaction on part of the U.N. also played into the hands of the Soviet while Jordan was warned to avoid any involvement. Despite the pleas of Israel to the UN two weeks before June 6, 1967, the UN did not take any positive action in defense of Israel. In the same way, the maritime nations also did not make any attempt to challenge the blockade as per their undertakings under the good faith agreements.[14] The result was that pre-emptive military defensive action was taken by Israel on June 6, 1967. The result was that during the next six days, Egypt lost control of Sinai and Gaza Strip. In the same way, Syria lost the control of Golan Heights. So far as Jordan is concerned, certainly Israel was not interested that Jordan should become involved and an additional front of conflict should be opened. For example, on June 5, a Foreign Ministry official of Israel notified General Odd Bull that the country was in a state of war with Egypt and Syria however it wanted to avoid any conflict with Jordan. The message was immediately sent and received by King Hussein. In the same way, warnings were also sent to the Secretary-General of the UN in New York in the hope that any attack will not be launched in Jerusalem, however by 11:35 AM, Jordan has opened fire. Although General Odd Bull and his staff tried that a cease-fire may be arranged however it could not be achieved. At 1:30 PM, the troops of Jordan entered the Government House as well as the UN compound in Jerusalem which was considered as diplomatically sacrosanct and took control amid the protests by the UN Observers who were present in the compound. The battle in Jerusalem as well as in the rest of the West Bank continuous for 96 hours more and eventually the Jordanian forces lost control and suffered a defeat.[15]

While the critics of Israel maintain that the 1967 War can be considered as the aggression of Israel instead of a war of self-defense, however by May 15, the Egyptian troops had started to move into Sinai, gathering near the Israeli border. In the same way, by 18 May, the troops of Syria were also preparing for battle near the Golan Heights, at a height of 3000 feet above Galilee from where they have shelled the villages of Israel for years. As a result of the Six-Day War, for the first time in its history, Israel found itself in the control of a territory that was earlier under the control of a foreign power. A number of legal questions were raised by this new situation regarding the rights and responsibilities of Israel under the circumstances.

Bibliography

AhronBregman, A History of Israel (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 106

Charles W. Yost, “The Arab-Israeli War: How It Began,” Foreign Affairs 46, (January 1968), 319.

Galia Golan, “The Soviet Union and the Outbreak of the June 1967 Six-Day War,” Journal of Cold War Studies 8, no. 1 (January 2006), 5-7

Isabella Ginor, “The Cold War’s Longest Cover-Up: How and Why the USSR Instigated the 1967 War,” Middle East Review of International Affairs 7, (September 2003); Moshe Gat, “Nasser and the Six Day War, 5 June 1967: A Premeditated Strategy or An Inexorable Drift to War?” Israel Affairs 11, (October 2005).

Isabella Ginor, The Cold War’s Longest Cover Up: How and Why The USSR Instigated The 1967 War, vol. 7, Issue #3,Meria Journal, Sept. 2003

Janice Gross Stein, “Calculation, Miscalculation, and Conventional Deterrence II: The View from Jerusalem,” in Psychology and Deterrence, ed., Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), 60-88

Masahiro Murakami, Managing Water for Peace in the Middle East: Alternative Strategies, United Nations University Press, New York, 1995

Michael B. Oren, Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East (London: Penguin Books, 2003), 226

Mohamed Heikal, “Maw’dMa’a Al-Harb” (An Appointment with War) WeghatNazarno. 23 (December 2000): 15; Oren, Six Days of War, 48

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Odd Bull, War and peace in the Middle East: The Experiences and Views of a UN Observer, Leo Cooper; London, 1976, pp. 72-78

Salah Nasr, Mozakerat Salah Nasr (Memories of Salah Nasr), vol. 3, Ala‘amAlhazin(The Sad Year) (Cairo: Dar Al-Khayal, 1999), 209

Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, ed., Walter Blanco and Jennifer Roberts, trans. Walter Blanco, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1998), 32