Introduction
Neverland Institute of Technology (NIT) should be granted judgment in its favor. Plaintiff allege that he was discriminated against under the Fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution of the Equal Protection Clause when NIT rejected his application to an engineering program called STEPS based on his gender. However, plaintiffs’ claim fails as a matter of law and undisputed facts.
First, plaintiff cannot establish that he was deprived of his rights and that defendant acted under color of law. Plaintiffs cannot, for example, establish that rejection into the program was not an exception to the Intermediate Scrutiny Test. In addition, plaintiff cannot establish that they suffered damages. The record includes no evidence that plaintiff suffered any damages or that his future career is affected.
Plaintiff’s gender discrimination claim also fails because he applied to the STEPS program knowing that it was an all-girls program. Finally, plaintiff’s gender discrimination claim must fail because the rejection into the STEPS program by NIT is for governmental interest and has a substantial related means of that interest.
For all these reasons, plaintiff’s claim for gender discrimination fails as a matter of law, and summary judgment in Neverland Institute of Technology (NIT)’s favor should be granted.
Statement of Facts
Neverland Institute of Technology was founded in 1890 as a private educational institute where it limited its’ enrollment to male students until 1965. In 1976, NIT became a public university. In 1976, only 1.5 percent of the students enrolled in NIT of CECS were female. In the year of 2000, mechanical engineering Professor Maria Goeppert Mayer started working at NIT and was the only female faculty at the University. In 2000, fewer than 10 percent of the students were female, and those in that percentage did not do well in class. Many felt isolated and lacked confidence in their abilities in math and engineering courses. Mr. Magnati made it a priority to recruit female students. He authorized recruiters to make promising phone calls to female high school students informing them about female engineers. But those efforts had no impact. In 2003, Professor Mayer proposed that CECS host Science Technology & Engineering Preview summer camp (STEPS); a summer camp for girls in the 9th and 10th grade. Professor Mayer volunteered to “make it happen.” She said that she would organize the program, find corporate sponsors to fund it, and ask volunteers to teach classes. The only cost for NIT would be to provide dorms and classrooms.
The first STEPS program in the summer of 2003 was a great success. The girls were asked to fill out a questionnaire about the camp. Which some commented stating “this was the best week of my life”, “now that I know what engineers do; I think this is the career for me”? Along with “before STEPS I had never met a woman engineer.” In 2003, only 14 percent of CECS undergraduates were female. But in 2005, that number slightly increased to 15 percent. Then in 2007, it went up to 20 percent, which is to be believed that the increment was due to girls who participated in the STEPS program applied to NIT. Finally, in 2014-2015, 38 percent of students entering CECS were female. The girls rated the program from 1 to 10 (10 the highest) in which it received an average score of 9.8. That increase was because of the successful STEPS program. Having more women at the school makes the University more diverse. The increase in female students has also increased the total number of students enrolled at CECS. Some women stated that though they did not participate in STEPS, they were attracted to CECS because the STEPS camp showed that they welcome female students.
STEPS has also helped CECS recruit female faculty. Though CECS had offered faculty to other females, none of them had accepted the offers. Stating that they were not interested in teaching at a university with few female students and faculty. Since the STEPS program, CECS has succeeded in hiring ten more female faculty, whom all indicated that STEPS was one of the factors that influenced them to accept the teaching position.
The mission of CECS is to prepare the students to assume leadership roles in the nation, use technology responsibly to solve societal problems, and lastly to work effectively as team members. Half of the world’s population is females; therefore enrollment at CECS should reflect that reality. Only then can they adequately prepare all their graduates, both male and female to meet those goals. In 2015, more students graduated with degrees from CECS than ever before. There is a high demand for engineers in Neverland and across the country. Each year more than 500 companies recruit CECS students for all positions. Attracting more women to engineering careers helps fill the growing demand. Hence, starting the STEPS program was to attract more women to engineering careers and to encourage qualified women to apply to NIT college of CECS. The female students seem to have more confidence in class and feel less isolated.
NIT is a public educational institution. It is a state-run institution that receives federal and state funds. In April 2018, Jan Bennett applied to the STEPS program. The application doesn’t require applicant to disclose gender. On May 2, 2018, NIT accepted Jan (Plaintiff) into the program. Plaintiff was sent a roommate information survey to determine roommate compatibility. Plaintiff’s responses indicated that he was a male. NIT phoned Plaintiff’s home to confirm the gender and after confirming that Plaintiff was a male, informed Plaintiff’s mother that the camp was an all-girls summer camp. On May 16, 2018, NIT rejected Plaintiff from the program. Plaintiff asserts that he was discriminated against in violation of 42 U.S.C § 1983, and in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
NIT asserts that the STEPS program has succeeded in increasing the number of female enrollments. Also, that at one point, it considered the possibility of admitting boys to STEPS, but rejected that plan for various reasons. One being that NIT was already successful in recruiting male students, two the difficulty of providing housing for a mixed group, and lastly, their communal bathroom makes it inappropriate for co-ed living. Also, that NIT would like to sponsor a summer program like STEPS that would include boys and girls but currently do not have the funds required to pay professors and other employees to supervise and staff the program. STEPS exist only because Professor Mayer volunteered her own time to organize the program and solicit contributions for the program. Because of budget cuts, NIT cannot afford to fund another camp.
NIT prides themselves on their efforts to attract females to their once predominantly male school. Dean Wong of GLU (a school that sponsored STEPS) states that it is his responsibility to ensure diversity in their student body. Increasing female enrollment at the school makes the University more diverse and provides a better education for both male and female students. Prospective students consider diversity in choosing a university.
Ms. Patel who was a camper at STEPS states that though she had always received good grades in her math and science classes, she had never considered a career in engineering, but meeting female engineers at the STEPS CAMP in 2004 changed her life. After STEPS, she decided to attend NIT, stating that its sponsorship of STEPS proved to her that it was committed to educating women in science. STEPS is successful because it’s limited to girls. STEPS has allowed girls to take leadership roles and discover that science is more challenging and rewarding, and that there’s more to it than being lab assistants. “If STEPS had admitted boys, I probably wouldn’t be an engineer today.”
Plaintiff in applying to the STEPS program knew that the program started as an all-girls only camp. He asked his math teacher not to mention his gender when writing his letter of recommendation for the program. CECS offers a co-ed summer camp called Robotics. Mr. Bennett wasn’t interested in that program. CECS also offers a coed camp on nuclear engineering. Again, Plaintiff wasn’t interested in that program either. Lastly, CECS offers a coed summer camp called Technical Solutions to Societal Problems. Plaintiff didn’t apply for that program either. Mr. Bennett only applied to for STEPS and thought it would be amusing to see if he can get admitted to an all-girls camp because his name is Jan which sounds like a female’s name.
Argument
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) provides that summary judgment is appropriate if “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Although the party seeking summary judgment initially bears responsibility for informing the court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record that it believes demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, it is not required to support the motion with affidavits or other materials that negate the opponent’s claim. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).
Once the moving party has satisfied its initial burden, Rule 56(e) requires the nonmoving party to “go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 324 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)); see also Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990) (holding that the non-moving party must bring forth “specific facts” to support its Complaint and cannot rely on conclusory allegations at the summary judgment stage).
Here, the submitted declarations, deposition testimony, and stipulations establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact for trial and that summary judgment should be granted in favor of NIT.
- Plaintiffs’ claim for gender discrimination should be dismissed as there is no genuine issue to any material fact. Plaintiff cannot prove that he was deprived of his rights and Defendant has indisputable evidence to disbar that claim.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 states that every person who acts under color of law and deprive an individual of their rights shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity.
In the present case, person acting under color of law is not in dispute and therefore will not be discussed.
Plaintiff asserts that his rights were violated under the fourteenth amendment equal protection clause for gender discrimination. Plaintiff’s showing of a prima facie case for gender discrimination is not in dispute. Therefore, Defendant has the burden of proving that their actions passed under the Intermediate Scrutiny Test.
Defendant has the burden to show that their actions passes under the Intermediate Scrutiny Test.
Discovery shows that Defendant’s actions passed under the intermediate scrutiny test and therefore summary judgment should be granted in NIT’s favor. To withstand constitutional challenge, previous cases establish that classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-198 (1976).
In this case, Plaintiff alleges that he was deprived of his rights when he was rejected from the STEPS program at NIT. As explained below, the facts establish that defendant acted under the scrutiny test. Furthermore, based on the evidence, a reasonable juror could agree that there was a governmental interest. Therefore, summary judgment should be granted based on the reasons explained below.
- Defendants’ gender classification served as an important governmental interest.
Defendants can establish the first element under the Intermediate Scrutiny Test; serving an important government interest. Defendants rejected Plaintiff from the program as means to achieve more diversity in their student body. As mentioned in the facts, out of the 3000 undergraduate students at CECS, only 700 of them are female. Hence the reason the STEPS program accepted only girls into the camp and not boys.
For example, denial or rejection into a program based on one’s demographic may qualify as means to promote diversity in a school’s student body. In Grutter v. Bollinger, a student applied to a law school program with her qualification meeting the standards but was denied admission based on her race. The school denied the applicant’s admission because they had a governmental interest in meeting the school’s policy on student diversity.
Gender based discrimination falls within the category of Sex-based classifications. The rationale behind the court applying intermediate sex-based classifications is constitutional challenges related to discrimination and equal protection before the law. Naturally women are considered weaker compared to their male counterparts in a naturally male dominated society. It is for the above reason that the government has to create special positions for women based on positive gender based discrimination.
In some cases the discrimination is set up in a statute to cure a disparity between the two sexes. Whenever sex-based classification is introduced in a particular statute, the affected parties have always rushed to court to challenge the constitutionality of such provisions citing the violation of Equal Protection Clause. The court however uses the Intermediate Scrutiny test under gender-specific or gender-neutral rationale to arrive at the best decision. In doing so the court has to consider issues such as similarly situated test, government interest rational and substantially related to goals and objectives of the government rationale as evidenced in the supreme court cases below;
In the case of Mississippi University for Women v Hogan, 458. U.S. 718 (1982) the United States Supreme Court ruled that the party occasioning the discrimination should establish before the court a strong positive justification to persuade the court on the need to declare such discrimination valid based on sex-based classification.
In so doing the court in the above case, used an intermediate scrutiny test in a very strict sense almost closer to strict scrutiny test. The court therefore ruled in favor of the applicants and held that admission of only one gender as provided under the Mississippi University for Women was in violation of the equal protection clause under the Fourteenth Amendment.
In the recent decisions the court has preferred exacting scrutiny for intermediate level of protection analysis as opposed to scrutiny in the stricter sense. In the Supreme Court case of J.E.B v Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S, There were specific strikes against male jurors during the jury composition. The court ruled that peremptory challenges based solely on a prospective juror’s gender are unconstitutional.
In the early Supreme Court decisions there was a clear indication that gender classifications were to receive a heightened level of scrutiny. In the case of Reed v Reed 404, U.S. 71 (1971) an Idaho statue has two sections providing for merits required to appoint administrator’s to an intestate estate. The first section of the statute grouped the administrators in to different classes and ranked them in an order of preference. The administrator was therefore supposed to be picked from the possible highly preferred class.
The other section of the Idaho statute, preferred male members to females in a certain given class. The proponents of the gender-based discrimination advanced an argument that the Idaho Supreme Court had decided that the preference statute was meant to purposefully avoid costly inquiries for determining the most suitable individual for the position of an administrator. The statute was therefore meant to reduce the workload of the Idaho probate courts.
The Federal Supreme Court applied the rationality review and struck down the sex-based classification. According to the court dissimilar treatment for men and women in the Idaho preference statute violated the Equal Protection Clause. The court stated that although the government’s objective of reducing the workload of probate courts was legitimate, mere use of gender classification to eliminate hearings based on merits was impermissible and unacceptable. The court therefore applied the gender neutral test to accept the government objective but on the other rejected the rationally of treating the two genders separately for mere purpose of administrative savings.
Two years immediately after the Reed case, the Supreme Court made another decision in the case of Frontiero v Richardson 411 U.S. 677 (1973). In the above case, the claimant sought to challenge two federal statutes, requiring servicewomen to prove the dependence of their husbands in order to receive an increased allowance for residential quarters and health benefits for the husband.
The statute however allowed the servicemen to claim their wives as independent and receive increased living quarters and medical benefits automatically without considering the wife dependence on him as a factor. The justification for this preferential treatment on men was that, wives usually depend on their spouses while husbands rarely do so. The other justification was that 99% of all military members were men. It was therefore an argument that the differential treatment was meant to result to a considerable saving of administrative expenses and manpower. The Supreme Court however struck down the statute. The four judges unanimously applied the strict scrutiny citing gender as a suspect class.
The plurality concluded that the statute offered dissimilar treatment to men and women who are in similar situations. The court therefore applied directly the test in the Reed case which is similarly-situated test. The court further addressed the government’s arguments that the differential treatment was cost effective and efficient in terms of administration. The court cited the Reed case decision and decided that it is unacceptable and impermissible to use gender based discrimination solely to achieve administrative convenience and efficacy.
From the above two cases laws, it is therefore evident that administrative convenience is not sufficient enough to be used as a very important government objective required to validate gender classifications and discrimination under intermediate scrutiny. In both Reed and Frontiero case the court was clear that even where the government has proven a clear objective and reason of according preferential treatment based on gender, administrative savings is not a sufficient reason to warrant non-identical treatment of men and women.
The Supreme Court in the case of Craig adopted intermediate level scrutiny of sex-based classification for the first time. Three years after the court’s decision in Craig, the Supreme Court made a decision in another case of Orr v Orr 440 U.S. 268 (1979). In the above case, the court had to examine the constitutionality of an Alabama Statute that required only husbands to pay alimony upon divorce and not wives.
The court that the Alabama law intended to serve two main objectives which were; to offer help to needy spouses using gender as a substitute for need and to compensate women for past discriminations during marriage. The applicants seeking to challenge the statute had argued that the main objective of the statute was to enforce state’s preference for allocating family responsibilities as opposed to any other objectives raised by the respondents. The court approached the question of who is a need spouse by looking at sufficiency and accuracy of sex and gender as a proxy for dependence.
The court relied on the case of Craig and Reed to make an inquiry on whether the statute’s sex-based classification and gender discrimination was premised upon some ground of the differential treatment having a fair and substantial relationship to the objects of the legislation. The second objective on compensation rationale was analyzed by the court basing on the extent to which women had been discriminated upon in the area of influence to which the statute applied. The court viewed the sexes of the spouses as not similarly situated in terms of opportunities in the statute’s sphere. The court also relied on earlier decided cases of Schlesinger v Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508 (1975) and Kahn v Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 353 (1974) to state that statutory distinctions can be drawn based on gender lines solely it will yield efforts to remedy the situations resulting from overt discrimination against women or from a socialization process of male dominated patriarchal society
The court in its final verdict however ruled that the statute was still unconstitutional despite sex being held to be a reliable proxy for need and the institution of marriage having discriminated women. The courts rationale for declaring the statute unconstitutional was premised on the fact that Alabama had already held individualized hearings at which the parties’ relative financial situations were considered.
The individualized hearings conducted by Alabama already fulfilled the state’s goals. Administrative convenience could therefore not be used as a basis to further the interests of the Alabama statute. Gender-neutral classifications in the statute already served the state’s compensatory purpose and therefore carry sexual stereotypes. The state cannot therefore be allowed to classify the same issue on the premise of sex.
The court in its holding assumed that the objectives to be advanced by the statute were very important and that the sexes were sufficiently different to enable the statute pass the equal protection analysis through intermediate level scrutiny. The court however had to strike down the statute because it failed to meet one crucial requirement which was that the Alabama state was unable to justify its course for not making individualized determinations and as a result treating the sexes in an identical manner through the use of the apparatus that was already established to determine such issues. The court’s set requirement that the Alabama state provide a well explained reason for failing to treat men and women identically is the basis and essence for the gender-based neutral test. The Orr case introduces another test called gender neutral test which add more requirements to compliment the requirements of the similarly-situated test.
The following year after the Orr’s case decision, the Supreme Court made another decision in the case of Wengler v Druggists Mutual Insurance Co 446 U.S. 142 (1980). In the case of Wengler, the claimants sought to invalidate a provision in the Missouri’s Worker’s compensation laws that denied widower death benefits unless requiring that he must be either mentally or physically incapacitated. The second requirement was that the widower was to prove dependence on his wife’s earnings. The conditions were however different from those required on a widow. The widow was granted death benefits by the statute without the conditions imposed on the widower. The court struck down the provision citing violation of the 14th Amendment on equal protection clause.
The respondents in the case however argued that the statute was meant to help widows and was constitutional because the hardship suffered by the widows from the loss of a spouse is more stiff and greater than that suffered by a widower. The court recognized the fact that providing for needy spouses is a crucial important government objective and that the Missouri statute was aimed at that goal. The court also conceded that the gender discrimination employed was substantially related to that core objective of the statute.
The court in its final verdict however argued that the gender-discrimination used in the statute did not serve the intended purpose fully because the needs of both the widows and widowers would still be met even if the state offers all the required benefits to both classes. The court argued that the state should have instead required members of both classes to demonstrate that they are in need and hence receive the full benefits regardless of sex-based classification.
Although administrative savings might be sufficient enough and important to warrant sex-based classification, the court held that such importance cannot be effectively brought out by the mere assertion of a significant difference in economic standing between widows and widowers. The court was of the view that the statute ought to have advanced a persuasive demonstration as to what the economic consequences might be in the event that men and women are treated equally under the worker’s compensation law. The Missouri statute was further found to be discriminative of both men and women. The statute denied widowers death benefits where similarly situated widows would receive them hence being discriminative against men. The statute also discriminated against women by denying them absolute entitlement to spousal protection benefits as working men received such entitlements against their female counterparts.
In 1980s the US Supreme Court made a decision in another interesting case of gender-based discrimination. In the case of Michael M. v Superior Court, 450, U.S. 464 (1981) the court upheld a California statutory-rape law that made it unlawful for a man to have sex with a woman less than eighteen years of age. The law therefore imposed criminal liability upon the male participant only. The state in its arguments submitted that the statute was an attempt to curb illegitimate teenage pregnancies. The court had to accept the state’s interest and argument as very important though the plurality of judges could not agree on the rationale to base on in deciding this case.
The court experienced some difficulties in agreeing upon the proper approach of analyzing cases with sex-based classification. Justice Rehnquist on behalf of a plurality of four judges wrote an opinion stating that gender classifications may not be entirely unrelated to any differences between men and women. The plurality proceeded on stating that the statute will only be upheld as valid where the gender classification is not sparking anger and resentfulness but realistically reflects the fact that the sexes are not similarly situated in a certain circumstance. The judges concluded that the gender-based classification at hand was sufficiently related to its objectives since the harm of teenage pregnancies largely affects young women. The legislature could reasonably have decided to punish only the party who suffers less harmful consequences of the prescribed conduct. In such conducts, it is girls who suffer greater harm. The risk of getting pregnant already serves as deterrence to females; a sanction imposed on male only would therefore equalize the deterrents to both sexes.
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan argued that the plurality errored in correctly applying the substantial-relation test. According to Justice Brennan, substantial-relation test required California to prove that a gender neutral statutory rape law would be less effective than the gender specific one at issue in deterring sexual activity leading to teenage pregnancy. The plurality on the other hand rejected this approach claiming that Justice Brennan had not accurately stated the relevant inquiry. The major point of disagreement between Justice Brenan and the Plurality was the legitimacy of the gender neutral test.
The state argued that the statute’s efficacy and efficiency would be impaired if the statute is made gender neutral since young women would no longer report the men with whom they had intercourse. The plurality accepted the above argument stating that a female is less likely to report violations of the statute if she herself would be subjected to criminal proceedings. Gender neutral statute would therefore result to few prosecutions than the statute at issue here.
During the same year of Michael’s case, the question of the validity of gender-neutral test arose again the same year in the case of Rostker v Goldberg 453 U.S 57 (1981). In the above case, the court in a five-four decision, upheld a male-only draft registration. The court examined the legislative history of the selective-service statute and concluded that the primary purpose of registration is to prepare for conscripting combat troops. The rationale used was that women are ineligible either by statute or regulation for combat duty. The court therefore upheld the statute. In this particular case, gender classification was not viewed as controversial, but rather realistic and showed that the sexes did not fall under similar circumstances. The constitution only requires the congress to treat similarly situated persons similarly and hence avoid superficial equality.
The Rostker case presented a peculiar situation because the gender-based discrimination in that particular case concerned a government activity in which sex discrimination was allowed by the constitution. Justice White and Justice Marshall in their dissenting opinion argued that in the event of a draft there would be vacant positions left to be filled by women hence there was no good reason to exclude women for registration if the draft created some room for them.
The court in dealing with the above dissenting argument stated that, registration women would interfere with military flexibility and that it was not worthy to undergo the trouble of registering all women when so few positions would be available. The court also observed that the need for women could easily be met by volunteers. The dissenters viewed the analysis of the majority decision as focusing on the wrong question. According to the dissenters, the court purported to apply the Craig v Boren test of similarly situated circumstances. The approach in the case at hand was however supposed to be totally different from the Craig case. According to majority, women were excluded from registration because they were not needed in the draft.
The dissention judges were of the opinion that the analysis done by the majority did not focus on the right question to be answered. The important inquiry under Craig’s case was not whether a gender-neutral classification would substantially advance important government interests. The issue at hand was whether the gender-based classification is itself substantially related to the achievement of the asserted governmental interest. Asserting what is substantially related to the interests of the government has always been a challenge in many cases due the vagueness of substantial relation.
The dissenters therefore wanted the Government to prove and demonstrate that excluding women from registration was substantially related to the goals of preparing for a draft of combat troops. The government was to show and demonstrate that gender-neutral statute would be a less effective means of attaining the intended goals. The court however preferred gender-specific test and upheld the statute.
Michael M. and Rostker case shows instances which the court focused on the gender-neutral inquiry as an independent though controversial, step in the substantial relation analysis. In both cases the court relied on similarly-situated test alone yet in both cases the court was constrained over addressing questions raised by the gender-neutral test as well.
In conclusion, STEPS program as offered by NIT was not discriminatory as claimed by the plaintiff since it was meant to advance an activity that was prioritized by the institution. The program was also meant to equalize the opportunities offered to both boys and girls in the engineering sector. STEPS program being a ladies’ only program was to serve the governments interests and the interests of the institution at large and it was substantially related to the goals intended and interests advances by the NIT and the Government at large.
CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, defendant respectfully requests that the Court grant its motion for summary judgment and dismiss the amended complaint in its entirety.
Dated: 28th October, 2019
Respectfully submitted,
/s/.
James F. Collier, Esq.
Aaron M. Goldstein, Esq.
.Donahue Hartgrove LLP
1750 Market Street, 48th Floor
Philadelphia, PA 19103-7599
(215) 617-9200
jcollier@donhart.com
References
Rostker v Goldberg 453 U.S 57 (1981)
Mississippi University for Women v Hogan, 458. U.S. 718 (1982)
J.E.B v Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S,
Reed v Reed 404, U.S. 71 (1971)
Frontiero v Richardson 411 U.S. 677 (1973)
Orr v Orr 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
Schlesinger v Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508 (1975)
Kahn v Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 353 (1974)
Wengler v Druggists Mutual Insurance Co 446 U.S. 142 (1980).
Michael M. v Superior Court, 450, U.S. 464 (1981)
Raag, Yadava, “Taking Rights Seriously- The Supreme Court on Strict Scrutiny” (2010) National Law School of India Review vol 22, No.2, pp 147-169
Stephen A. Siegel, “ The Origin of the Compelling State Interest Test and Strict Scrutiny” (2006) American Journal of Legal History, vol. 48, No. 4 pp 355-407
The “Substantial Relation” Question in Gender Discrimination Cases, https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4392&context=uclrev accessed 28 October, 2019
“Intermediate Scrutiny – Legal Information Institute”. topics.law.cornell.edu. January 15, 2014. Retrieved January 26, 2014.
“Intermediate scrutiny”. Answers.com. Retrieved January 26, 2014.
Kemp, David S. (March 19, 2012). “Sex Discrimination Claims Under Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause:”. Verdict. Justia. Retrieved November 18,2012.
Weisberg, D. Kelly (April 8, 2008). Family Law: Aspen Roadmap Law Course Outline. Aspen Publishers Online. pp. 58–. ISBN 9780735572256. Retrieved December 29, 2012.
Abigail Perkiss. “Defining protected classes: Same-sex marriage and judicial scrutiny”. blog.constitutioncenter.org. Retrieved January 26, 2014.
