Radicalisation and al-Shabaab Recruitment in Somalia
Al-Shabaab is a popular terrorist militant and terrorist group that commenced activities n 2006. Al-Shabaab means ‘Party of the Youth’ (Wise, 2011).The group mainly originates from Kisimayu Somalia (Africa) but has extended its operations to other countries including Kenya, Tanzania, Mozambique and Yemen (Joosse et al, 2015). It is composed of different ethnic groups and its leadership consists of Somalis who have undergone their training in Iraq and Afghanistan and a handful of foreigners from other countries. The group is headed by as the chief leader, deputy, a spiritual leader, political chief and Wasiir (Prime Minister) and a leader in charge of public affairs. However, it is instructive to note that most the high ranking leaders have surrendered to the Federal Government and some succumbed to drone strikes from the Unite States. Despite numerous attacks from the local government forces and other foreign forces the group sill remains active and strong (Anzalone, 2016). Its foot soldiers are mainly recruited from disparate countries within the neighboring Somalia. As of 2014 the group consisted of approximately 9000 militants.
The group mainly consists of youth ho are recruited from various countries. The youth are aged between 19-30 years of age (Botha, 2014). Although previously it was perceived that youth joined the terrorist group mainly due to unemployment from their countries, it has is has since enhanced its recruitment strategy. This has seen many educated and working youth leave their normal live to joining the militia. This has been accentuated by the fact that the youth are normally attracted to the promise of good pay once they join the group (Botha, 2014). In addition the group has also recruited educated young men to join the technical team of the group. In 2012 Fu’ad Mohamed Khalaf Shongole who was the head of awareness encouraged parents to let their girls join the terrorist group to fight alongside the men. This saw young girls and women being recruited to join the terrorist group. However, most of the women worked in different capacities such as cooking for the men when they trained and fought government forces in the forest.
In 2009 the group fought against the leadership of President Sharif Ahmed, who headed the Transitional Federal Government and the Islamic Courts Union (Abdile & Botha, 2014). It attacked the headquarters of the then weak Transitional Federal Government and killed three government ministers (Shinn, 2013). On December 3rd 2009 it admitted liability to the suicide bomb attack that occurred in a medical school graduation ceremony. In July 2011 Due to the persistent drought in Somalia, it is intriguing that the terrorist allowed international humanitarian groups to bring in food supports to the local areas that they had captured contrary to popular norm. Previously the group was hostile to aid workers and in many cases it attacked, harassed and detained them while demanding for huge sums of money as ransom. In 2017 it released three female workers that had been held hostage for two months in Hiran, central Somalia. Notably, the group has also been involved in Pirate activities at the Indian Ocean waters. Several crew members of ships sailing through the Somali waters have been attacked and kidnapped and only released after their governments have paid huge sums of money as ransom.
Alsabaab has mainly fashioned itself as a religious terrorist group fighting the jihad war (Marchal, 2009). Following the killing of Lee Rigby which Alshabaab claimed was revenge as a result of killing of Muslims, released a video encouraging British Muslims who had condemned the attack to arm themselves with knives and kill non-Muslims. Other attack that have been seen as to be aligned religious war include bombing of churches in the neighboring countries and the Garisa bus attack on 2nd November 2014 where the terrorist aimed to kill non-Muslim passengers in the bus. Conversely, the group has been involved in several political activities in its country of origin including influencing local clan politics national politics (Roque, 2009). It even fought to oust Somalis national president. It has attacked and killed various police officers, killed political leaders and bomb local police station in the neighboring country Kenya (Lind et al , 2015). In its quest to maintain its power and survival within the region, it has been involved in several fights for resources in different territories within its country and on the national boarders (Burns, 2010). Its influence on campaign and politics has had devastating impacts on the North Eastern part of Kenya where it has several recruits. Several attacks and bombings are usually reported during political campaigns (Lind et al , 2015).
On February 9, 2012, Mukhtar Abu al-Zubair through a message decoded in a video declared that Alshabaab was joining the Islamist extremist militia Al-Qaida and stated that it will pay allegiance to it. The leadership of Al-Qaida welcomed the idea and responded that Alshabaab was its new affiliate in the Eastern part of Africa. Following the merger of the two terrorist groups the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia officially made an announcement recognizing Alshabaab as being part of Al-Qaida. As of June 2012 Alshabaab was planning the initiation of a profound relationship with Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb AQIM and Boko Haram where three groups would be sharing intelligence, explosives and training facilities. Although, the United States was perceived to be the primary target of the merger, Fuad Shongole, an Alshabba senior leader announced that the merger was targeted carrying out the holy war in Kenya, Uganda, and later by God’s grace take the war to America. Although, Alshabaab had previously been working with Hizbul Islam, which is also a terrorist group on September 24, 2012 Hizbul Islam through its spokesperson announced that it was disassociating itself from Alshabaab citing the political changes in Somalia ands propaganda videos about Hizbul Islam Alshabaab had released. Although Alshabaab had disassociated itself from Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant on October 2015 it announced that it was paying allegiance to Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. This led to internal wars between Alshabaab leadership ranks and the suspension, detention and murder of some of its members loyal to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant.
One cannot cast aspersions on the fact that, Alshabaab terrorist activities have hit the media airwaves in the recent past. However, the ban on polythene bags that was imposed by its leaders on some of the terrorize it controlled as a measure of protecting human and animal life was seen as a positive measure. Against this backdrop, international leaders argued that although such as a measure was desirable in the global campaign against climate change it was overshadowed by the massive bombing and killings the terrorist group had carried out in various countries. Afghan President Ashraf Ghani through his spokes person stated that the measure was only a sideshow intended to mislead and deceive public opinion. Suffice to say, the United States government has offered several cash rewards for any information that would lead to the capture and arrest of some of the notorious Alshabaab members. On June 7 2012 the United States government offered seven million dollars for any intelligence given too it that would lead to the capture and of seven senior commanders of the Alshabaab Militia.
Although terrorist group still exists and carries out its operations, several of it members have defected to support the Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government (Shinn, 2013). A striking example is the defection of commander of the Maymana Brigade Sheikh Mohamed Abdullahi on November 2009. Many of the members who defected from the terrorist group contended that the bombing, execution and suicide killings were unbearable and that the group was giving a misleading interpretation of Islam. By and large the international community is still stepping up efforts to wipe out the group.
References
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Anzalone, C. (2016). The Resilience of al-Shabaab. CTC Sentinel, 9(4), 13.
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Burns, A. (2010). Feeling the pinch: Kenya, Al-Shabaab, and East Africa’s refugee crisis. Refuge: Canada’s Journal on Refugees, 27(1).
Joosse, P., Bucerius, S. M., & Thompson, S. K. (2015). Narratives and counternarratives: Somali-Canadians on recruitment as foreign fighters to Al-Shabaab. British Journal of Criminology, 55(4), 811-832.
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Shinn, D. (2013). Al-Shabaab Tries to Take Control in Somalia. Foreign Police Institute. Retrieved, 7.
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