Introduction
The definition of truth varies among people and society and for this reason, people hold diverse opinions on the value of truth. Truth is, however, most often defined as conformity to fact, reality, accuracy as well as experience. The contemporary society uses truth to refer to people’s authenticity or genuine thoughts and beliefs. Dobson (419), however, disagrees with the view that truth is subject to people’s beliefs by arguing that the truth is transcultural and universal which means that the same truth holds for all people. For instance, one plus one will always be two (Dobson 422). The two doctors also argue that since truth is fact, it cannot be changed by people’s beliefs or thoughts.
According to popular belief, people like the truth. In fact, honesty is one virtue that most people regard highly. Even philosophers emphasize the value of truth as shown by Plato’s quote, “of all things good, truth holds first place among the gods and men alike’ (Hilary 155). The consensus about the value of truth is that it holds an intrinsic attraction. This means that people want the truth even when it has no use for them. To most people, the truth is just worth knowing (Brady 273). Peck (163) supports this argument in Aristotle’s quote “‘all men by nature desire to know.” The other belief about the value of truth is that it is essential as it leads to the attainment of goals. Truth is thus classified as having either intrinsic or instrumental value.
The intrinsic value of truth
According to Paul Horwich (365), to value the truth refers to people’s desire to only believe what is true. It is thus good and worthy to believe in the truth and undesirable to believe what’s false or untrue (Lloyd 109). The truth is always valuable for its own sake even when there are no goals or even when the consequences are negative (DePaul 177).From the Christian story of creation, for instance, we see that Adam and Eve defied God’s command and ate the fruit from the tree of knowledge after the serpent tricked them. Adam and Eve disobeyed despite their knowledge of the consequences. Adam and Eve did this in an effort to find out whether indeed God had lied to them.
Instrumental value of truth
The instrumental value of truth exists in its usefulness in achieving other goals or aims (Keith 421). In this scenario, the truth is a means to an equally or even more valuable end. Truth thus lacks instrumental value if it does not help carry out a certain goal.
CHAPTER TWO
Statement of position: Truth lacks intrinsic value
Various philosophers argue that truth always has intrinsic value even when the instrumental value does not exist. This essay, however, disagrees with this opinion and seeks to prove that the intrinsic value of truth is non-existent which makes truth only instrumentally valuable.
Supportive argument
Proponents of the intrinsic value of truth tend to generalize that by nature, human beings seek the truth about their surrounding even when there are no practical reasons. Cohen’s statements such as ‘truth is worth having in itself’’ (130) tend to generalize the nature of man. But as many instances have proven throughout human existence, it is difficult to discern the desires of all people.
Human beings are diverse and therefore giving them general classification would only distort the facts. Kornblith (150) best shows this claim when he states that human beings are quite diverse with some bearing very strange characteristics. He further argues that such diversity makes it very had to make a valid claim that is universally true. It is thus implausible to suggest that truth always has intrinsic value.
As shall be shown later, the intrinsic value of truth faces the problem of trivial truths since even the most insignificant and worthless beliefs are still given value by virtue of their existence. Another argument in support of the non-existence of the intrinsic value of truth is the fact that human beings seek truth to ensure human survival. For instance, many consider the study of space to be intrinsically valuable. Scientists have however used these studies to find ways to support life in space.
CHAPTER THREE
Objections to the non-existence of intrinsic value
Numerous scholars and philosophers have for long supported the view that truth has intrinsic value. By supporting this view, therefore, they object the proposition that intrinsic value of truth is non-existent. Below are the various objections and the valid responses against them.
1. Human beings inherently seek the truth hence its intrinsic value
Various philosophers such as Plato as well as authors Horwich and Lynch are of the opinion that truth is valuable for its own sake. For instance, Lynch (502) writes that most people desire the truth despite there not being a useful reason. Truth is thus desired without the existence of a practical reason and so according to these philosophers, it must have intrinsic value. Horwich (348) goes on to argue that truth has intrinsic value since people still show academic interests in fields such as ancient history, metaphysics and esoteric mathematics which have no pragmatic value.
Reply
The argument by Horwich, however, is ineffective. Researchers in the field of ancient history study this field with an aim of satisfying enthusiasts’ curiosity (Daniel 231). Additionally, ancient history has practical value in various fields such as filmmaking for entertainment. Films based on ancient historical events act as a source of livelihood for the actors, cameramen and the crews involved. Of equal importance is the fact that human beings refer to ancient history before taking certain actions since ancient history offers great life lessons (Pascal 187). Metaphysics which deals with such concepts as being, time and space is also practical as it shapes people’s beliefs about their existence (Feldman 67). For instance, metaphysics determines people’s norms and beliefs about the existence or non-existence of God which in turn determines people’s behaviors. Additionally, many esoteric mathematical formulas once considered idealistic have proved useful in fields such as computer programming and physics. The fact that all these fields are practical one way or the other means that truth holds instrumental value and no intrinsic value whatsoever.
2. People seek truth only to gain knowledge and nothing more hence its intrinsic value
Lynch (502) argues that if the truth was only composed of instrumental value and no intrinsic value, then it would be okay to believe in falsehood. Lynch (502) further argues that even in the absence of instrumental value, people do not believe falsehood since it impedes knowledge. In the above statements, Mathew (303) says that Lynch implies that the belief of falsehood does not depend on morality but rather on a person’s cognitive and epistemic awareness. To explain this, Lynch (509) writes that people seek the truth with an aim of satisfying epistemic curiosity. According to Lynch, therefore, beliefs are correct or incorrect, only based on whether they are true.
Reply
The human evolutionary past shows that humans consider truth useful only if it proves beneficial and positively life-changing. The aim of human cognitive capacity, therefore, is to acquire truth if it enhances human survival (Philip 524). Therefore while a belief may seem correct according to human cognition, it is incorrect if it does not ensure the survival of the human species.
3 Scientific and mathematical truths are evidence of the intrinsic value of truth
There exist experts who use scientific and mathematical truths as evidence of intrinsic value. For instance, Grimm (723) gives examples of fields such as cosmology which has no practical benefit to humankind. Kitcher (216) also expresses similar belief by stating that history has indeed proven that wise people often seek answers to questions that fascinate them despite the lack of practical value. For instance, people are curious about the extinction of dinosaurs even though knowing the cause would add no real value to their lives. Philosophers even argue that it is the inherent desire for the truth that led humankind to form myths where there exists a gap in reliable knowledge (Lepock 388).
Reply
Mathematical and scientific truths are insufficient in proving the existence of intrinsic value since they have an inadequate level of generality. The mathematical and scientific examples given by Grim suggest that a true belief is always valuable. This is however is not the case since people sometimes only want the truth when it relates to specific areas of concern. Such kind of people tend not to care about the truth when it relates to areas where they have no particular interest. For instance, take the case of Gloria who is very enthusiastic about the world of science and mathematics. Gloria, however, hates truths about politics. She watches news channels that she knows are unreliable and politically biased.
In such a case it would defy reason to argue that Gloria exhibits intrinsic value for all truths. It would, however, be right to say that Gloria shows intrinsic value for truth in areas of interest which are science and mathematics. Gloria only wants the truth because it fits a particular context. This, therefore, means that a researcher’s intrinsic value in certain fields does not necessarily mean that they view all truths as intrinsic.
CHAPTER FOUR
Trivial truths
The argument that truth possesses intrinsic value presents the problem of trivial truth. Since truth is worth knowing for its own sake, one would assume that even the most insignificant of truths has intrinsic in value. However, that is not the case since some truths are quite boring and uninteresting. The intrinsic value of truth thus tends to give value to what are worthless truths (Williams 10).
Consider a scenario where Patricia spends the entire day counting the number of grains contained in a kilogram of rice. Also, consider the case of Bruce who spends his time counting the total number of stars in the sky. It is acceptable that both Patricia and Bruce will get many truths as well as avoid many falsehoods. However, from a rational perspective, it is quite clear that Bruce and Patricia are engaging in utter nonsense and no rational thinker would want to involve themselves in such activities. Critics use trivial truths to question the validity of the intrinsic value of truth. If people think that truth is intrinsically valuable, then they seem would not be uninterested in so many truths (Grimm 726).
Since trivial truths undermine the intrinsic value of truth, proponents made various changes to help support the relevance of the intrinsic value of truth.
Responses to trivial truths
Various responses have been provided in an effort to eliminate the problem of trivial truths (Thomas 241). This paper however discusses the two most prominent ones.
1. Truth as a prima facie value
This response to trivial truths states that although all truths are valuable, the degree varies thus making some truths more valuable than others. On the basis of this response, proponents argue that the value of trivial truths is outweighed by other factors. According to Lynch (498), the value of trivial truths is usually limited by factors such as time. According to Horwich (368), the truth is always valuable but some truths conflict with others and in such a case, one has to sacrifice the value of some truths for the sake of others.
The consensus among proponents of the intrinsic value of truth is that all truths including trivial ones are intrinsically valuable (Dan 521). Proponents further argue that trivial truths only seem to lack a sense of worth because their value is overridden by truths that offer a more practical payoff (Mcgrath 309). It is for this reason that most people are indifferent towards trivial truths. Proponents therefore believe that in the absence of time limitations human beings would be more interested trivial truths.
Arguments against truth as a prima face value
i) Conditional perspectives
Truth as a prima face value fails at solving the issue of trivial truths as it still holds that trivial truths are valuable (Christopher 388). According to prima facie therefore, trivial truths such as counting rice grains remains valuable only that it is outweighed by other truths. This argument is however inadequate since seeking trivial truths even in the absence of the supposed limitations does not look valuable from a rational point of view.
The intrinsic value ascribed to trivial truths is not as minimal as the prima facie response would like people to believe (Zagzebski 14). One can prove this by the use of conditions as done in mathematics. For instance, take y to be a truth and form the condition: “If doing activity y is intrinsically valuable, then it is not a bad way of spending one’s entire life.” Now suppose y is a trivial truth. This would mean that it still holds intrinsic value, even if slightly small. Using the condition above, therefore, even when y is at absolute minimum, a person who spends his whole life carrying out activity y “has not spent his life in a bad way.” That statement however contradicts rational thought. Using the above example, the prima face response becomes ridiculous since there is not even minimal intrinsic value in trivial truths (Fred 61). If there were, then a person engaging in them would not be said to have lived a worthless life as happens.
Harry (57) supports the above opinion by arguing that being concerned about something is completely different from desiring it more than other things. Harry (58) goes further to say that trivial truths have no intrinsic value since attributing intrinsic value to a truth suggests that it makes rational sense to desire the truth for its own sake. .Seeking trivial truths, however, defies rationality (Renna 241). Since the conditions above prove that trivial truths still exist even in the use of prima face response, it then follows that intrinsic value of truth is not wholly valid.
The conditions are however not applicable to the instrumental value of truth since it would make no sense for one to spend their whole life doing u if it would not help in gaining m. A clearer example would be a person who spends his entire life storing money without using it to acquire things that please him. In such a case, the person would have wasted their life since the instrumental value of money was not utilized. The truth is therefore valuable if it has an instrumental value which means that not all true beliefs are valuable.
ii) The overriding considerations perspective
Proponents of the intrinsic value of truth argue that if the overriding considerations were none existent, then people would be more willing to seek trivial truths (Weijers 514). Lynch supports this claim by stating that if there were no limitations such as time, then he would have no reluctance in seeking trivial truths. Similarly, if humankind were a finite being then, they would desire every truth (Kvanvig 45).
This argument is however ineffective and irrational as proven by Grimm (732) who suggests that if human immortality replaced finitude and counting dust became intellectually valuable, then immortality would be considered uninteresting and not worth experiencing. Using the previous example, it means that if immortality makes counting rice grains an intellectual practice, then death seems more valuable than living such a life.
iii) Some trivial truths are negative
The intrinsic value of truth argument accords value to all truths no matter how trivial they seem. This argument is however ineffective not only because some trivial truths have no value at all but also because some have negative consequences (Whiting 220). For instance, a person can seek trivial truths such as what it feels like to torture, racially assault or kill somebody. Seeking such truths would have negative consequences since they defy the universally accepted moral and principles.
2. Only a restricted class of truths have intrinsic value
Another response designed to overcome the problem of trivial truths is the argument that only a certain cluster of truths have intrinsic value. Restricting intrinsic value to only a certain cluster of truths denies trivial truths the intrinsic value given to them by the prima face response (Descartes 9). Goldman (88) best advocates for this response to trivial truths when he states that individual S ignorance of seemingly insignificant truths does not imply a lower ranking of his credal state since not knowing answers to these truths is not taken into account. Goldman (89) argues that it is essential to use a question answering model that takes into consideration only issues that are of particular interest to S. This way, individual S will only be evaluated based on areas of interest.
Arguments against this response
Restricting the intrinsic value of truth to only a certain group of truths contradicts what intrinsic value stands for, which is, the truth is worth having in itself. The intrinsic value of truth expresses the desire for the truth and nothing but the truth (Graham 149). It would, therefore, be self-contradictory to state that some but not all truths are intrinsically valuable.
To further explain this point consider the use of conditions in the case of restricted truths. Belief q is valuable if and only if: (a) it is true and (b) falls in the relevant reserved class. From these conditions, it is clear that the first condition is necessary but not sufficient to accord intrinsic value to a belief. This, however, contradicts intrinsic value which is solely based on the first condition.
According to Goldman’s argument, a person’s interest in the truth is what determines whether the belief falls in the relevant class and therefore whether it has value. This argument, is, however, invalid. Consider the practical example of Gordon who accidentally discovers a certain truth about the evolutionary theory of human beings that would change existing biological truths.
The above example raises the question of whether Gordon’s discovery is worth believing for its own sake. The relevant answer according to the intrinsic value of truth would be affirmative. In the case of restricted truths, however, the answer to the question above would be negative. This is because Gordon only stumbled upon the discovery which means he had no interest in the truth. From these examples, the proposition that a true belief is valuable only if it falls under a relevant class of truths is incompatible with the intrinsic value of truth.
Conclusion
The non-existence of the intrinsic value of truth is plausible as proven by the above arguments. All truths are only valuable to humankind by virtue of their practicability (Engel 426). On this basis, therefore, not all true beliefs are valuable. The propositions supporting the intrinsic value of truth are ineffective since they have various flaws the most conspicuous being the problem of trivial truths (Parkes 148). The belief that trivial truths are worth seeking is implausible and wrongly accords value to worthless beliefs (Coates 106). Even the various responses to the problem of trivial truths fail to provide a relevant solution. As argued in the essay, the prima face value of truth fails horribly since it continues to accord value to trivial truths. Likewise, the belief that only a restricted class of truths are valuable fails to provide a solution since it further contradicts the intrinsic value of truth (Strickland 108). It, therefore, may only be a matter of time before scholars and philosophers banish the intrinsic value of truth in its entirety.
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